What was the madrid conference
Some issues, such as Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, refugees, security arrangements, water, and borders, were left to the final status talks. The DOP did not include an Israeli commitment to freeze settlement activities in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem; it did not specify the effective extent of the settlements and military locations to which the Israeli army will redeploy, and consequently, the lands that will be transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction during the interim period.
The ongoing expansion of settlements and limited land transfer eventually doomed the agreement to failure. With hindsight, the fact that the DOP did not provide for binding arbitration and contained only broad principles requiring further negotiations to implement them left the Israeli side with the upper hand. The world generally hailed the accord as the beginning of a negotiated end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, a coalition of ten Palestinian groups opposed to the negotiations was created in Damascus in September On 2 September , the coalition issued a statement declaring that the text of the agreement to be signed meant perpetuating the Israeli occupation, transforming the Palestinians into its instruments, and establishing a Palestinian police force to protect Israeli security and repress the Palestinian people.
The two decades since the signing of the Oslo Agreement have witnessed the passing of the five-year deadline without any final peace treaty, the eruption of the second intifada in , the general cessation of meaningful negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and, perhaps most importantly, the continued expansion and entrenchment of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank coupled with a crippling siege of the Gaza Strip. The results of the Oslo Agreement might thus be viewed as a reconfiguring of the framework for occupation rather than a step toward statehood or liberation.
Abbas, Mahmoud. Ashrawi, Hanan. Mansour, Camille. Said, Edward. New York: Vintage Books, Savir, Uri. Co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, it was the first time that representatives from Israel , Palestinians and representatives from Arab countries that had not yet formally recognized Israel came together to discuss the prospects for peace in direct negotiations. US President George H. Bush saw it as redemption of pledges he had made to Arab leaders in setting up the anti-Saddam Hussein coalition during the Gulf War.
Israel was incensed by the inclusion of Palestine Liberation Organization representatives, albeit as part of the Jordanian delegation. The talks were based on United Nations Resolutions and as well as the Camp David Accords of , accepting the "land-for-peace" formula for resolving the Arab- Israeli conflict.
There, on the side in swirling robes, was a representative of the Gulf Cooperation Council, an Emirate Arab. He was the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. There were also European Community and United Nations observers. Many of these arrangements had been initially strenuously resisted by the Israelis and certain others. Finally, it all worked out. It was a sweet, yet sorrowful sight because Gorbachev was already on the way down….
The arguments presented were standard on all sides. There was no great breakthrough, in substantive terms. However, a key element here came into play, in the sense that a major part of the choreography was that there would be bilateral agreements reached after the end of this conference, to be negotiated in Madrid. The Israelis argued vociferously that they should take place in and around Israel. The Arabs rejected this proposal, and a compromise was reached that bilateral agreements would be worked out in Madrid, at least with the Syrians, immediately after the close of the principal conference.
Then, later on, multilateral negotiations would take place on such issues as water, regional and environmental, and economic questions.
So there were many breakthroughs in terms of resolving long-standing taboos. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir turned out reasonably well in comparison with El Shara, who was chief of the Syrian delegation. Shamir appeared to be quite moderate, certainly for Israeli home consumption. The conference was a magnificent TV sight for the world, including Israel, to watch.
There were the Arabs with the TV cameras panning around the conference table. There was Israeli Prime Minister Shamir holding forth, as well as [Benjamin] Netanyahu speaking to a worldwide audience to the conference proceedings broadcast from Madrid TV.
He was very, very effective, as was Hannan Ashrawi in her own way, speaking for the Palestinian cause. A particularly nasty development took place on the last day, a Friday. Prime Minister Shamir took his leave on grounds that, as Prime Minister, he had to be back home in time for the beginning of Shabat [Jewish Sabbath] that evening.
He apologized for leaving the conference and expressed the hope that no one would take his departure amiss. El Shara said that this labeled him forever after as a terrorist. El Shara said that it was intolerable that this man, Shamir, should be lecturing the conference, given all of the horrible things he had done to Arabs during the years. He said that it was well known that Syrian and Arab hospitality had been extended to the Jews over the centuries.
He said that Syrians and Arabs had been the most beneficial administrators of the territories under their control. For anyone who had even a rough idea of the plight of the Jewish community in Syria, this was a bit difficult to swallow. So there we were. The Madrid Conference was a great accomplishment in which the Israelis, including Prime Minister Shamir himself, could bask for some time.
However, this atmosphere did not last long. By September, , just before the Madrid peace conference, President Bush, with Secretary of State Baker at his side, had called for a day delay in reaching a decision over the U. Bush said that the extension of this loan guarantee was very controversial among the Arabs, who had the mistaken impression that U. The arrangements for the Russian Jews were specifically designed to settle them in Israel proper, if you will, not the occupied territories.
These Jewish organizations took affront. They rose up in protest and gathered their Congressional friends and supporters. He went so far as to employ language about how we had risked American lives in defending the Israelis from SCUD missiles. The whole situation, taken together, was very, very disturbing to me.
It was part of a trend. By now I was coming to the end of my tour as Ambassador to Israel. In conversations with me, Secretary Baker had asked me what I was interested in doing next. I said that I was fully satisfied, careerwise.
To me, being Ambassador in Tel Aviv was enough. I said that I would like to stay on till the end of and then would be ready to go home and retire.
Baker sounded me out as to what might induce me to stay on in the Foreign Service.
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